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Abstract  ̶  Maintenance starts with reliable diagnostics. Programming Logic Controllers 
(PLCs) are often equipped with a high degree of diagnostic procedures in order to ensure 
that the processing unit is functioning correctly. It is vital to verify that the system with its 
programme is still within a 'healthy' state, otherwise a safety function is called and the 
system is brought into a safe state, or if possible, defect and malfunctioning components are 
exchanged during operation and the process can continue without shutting down the system. 
However, when it comes to smaller devices such as intelligent sensors, embedded controller 
devices with the functionality of an e.g. PID (Proportional-Integral-Derivative), predictive 
controller, filter or analytical algorithm, which is embedded into a FPGA or micro-controller 
then diagnostics and verification methods are often not considered in the way they should be. 
For example, if an intelligent sensor system is not able to diagnose that the sensor-head is 
malfunctioning, but the sensor-head still provides some data, then the smart algorithm bases 
its calculation on wrong data, which can cause a dangerous situation. This paper investigates 
and shows recent results to combine diagnostic methods for small scale devices. Several 
safety-related structures are considered with a high degree of diagnostic coverage. The paper 
presents relevant procedures and structures to increase the reliability of small devices 
without utilising a full scale microcontroller system. 
Keywords  ̶  Reliability, safety structure, maintenance, diagnosis. 
 
   
I INTRODUCTION 
Reliable system design is an important and fast 
growing research area with a wide range of 
applications, especially when international 
standards are involved. For example, in process and 
chemical industries safety programming logic 
controllers (PLC) and safety systems are necessary 
equipment to protect human lives, environment and 
production facilities. Research and development in 
this section on PLC is matured, however, still on-
going and far from completed but the necessary 
sensibility is available and present.  
When it comes to sensors or actuators the same 
sensibility is often missing or researchers and 
developers are simply not aware of these issues. In 
an investigation by the HSE [10] where a system 
was subdivided into three parts as shown in Figure 1 
and fatal accidents were related to the actual 
component that caused the accident. 
 
 
Fig. 1: System with its subdivisions 
A fault in the output-section was with 50% the main 
cause of accidents, followed by the category of 
sensors with 35% and only 15% were related to the 
actual processing unit, as shown in Figure 2. The 
last part (processing unit) is the area where most of 
the research and development has been done in the 
past years. 
When it comes to predictive maintenance then 
sensors are of great importance as they measure the 
health state of a system or component and either 
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 diagnose the current state immediately or send the 
information to a superior unit that carries out the 
analysis. Especially in the first case, the sensor itself 
is not a passive measurement device anymore but an 
entire system with input, processing unit and output. 
 
Fig. 2: Relation Accidents to causes 
 
When a new intelligent sensor device, a new control 
algorithm or filter is developed, then the standard 
way is to use components from the shelf like a 
microcontroller and the algorithm is converted or 
directly downloaded. For standard application this is 
a suitable way. For more reliable design this is not 
enough. 
The development of a reliable system starts always 
with a specification, where it is defined what the 
system should do (necessary requirements), and 
servers as a test bench afterwards. During the design 
and implementation phase the work has to be 
verified according to specification that the 
development still matches the requirements. After 
the development and verification, the system can 
installed. 
When it comes to the lifecycle of a system and the 
causes of failures then most errors are done in the 
specification phase. Again this investigation has 
been carried out by HSE [11] and the results are 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3: Failure versus Roots 
 
However, much work has been done, in the 
direction of how to get requirement formulations 
more precise.  
The last two figures show that sensor design is 
important as it is the cause of many failures but the 
careful design from the beginning should not be 
underestimated. As sensors are important for 
maintenance and e-maintenance in order to diagnose 
the health state of the observed system, it is also 
important that the health state of the sensor itself is 
diagnosed, as it is vital to ensure that the right 
information are available to make the right 
judgment. 
The remaining paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 presents a short literature survey, section 
3 describes recent results investigate within the 
department and section 4 draws some conclusions 
and state future work. 
 
II MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
Different aspects of the development of safety and 
reliable systems are detailed in the publication by 
Schwarz [18], in this case the development of a 
sensor system was described using 
Matlab/Simulink. Two main approaches exist; the 
first uses an automated generated c-code which is 
executed by an operating system, the second uses a 
VHDL approach directly for a hardware board. 
However, the development follows in both cases the 
v-model [12] methodology for the design of reliable 
/ safe systems. The system can be tested during 
every stage of each design phase. Different 
architectures are detailed as well different tests and 
checks.  
Marek Sniezek and Josef von Stackelberg [19] 
describe in their publication on 'A fail safe 
programmable logic controller' a hardware 
approach to develop a safe controller that fulfills the 
requirement of the international standard IEC 61508 
[12] for the safety integrity level 3(SIL 3). They 
describe a novel safe comparator strategy to 
distinguish between different safety faults and to 
achieve a fast reaction time. 
Riccardo Mariani and Gabriele Boschi [16] are 
dealing with robust memory approaches. 
International standards such as the IEC 61508 [12] 
or others demand that developer considers errors 
and faults in the memory of embedded controller 
systems and deploy methods and techniques to deal 
with those effects.  
Grießing et al. and Alvarez et al from the University 
of Vigo, Spain present another approach direction. 
Grießing et al. from the University of Graz and 
associated companies [7], [8], [9] describe a 
Output
50%
Processing 
Unit
15%
Input
35%
Accidents
44%
21%
14%
6% 15%
Failure
Specification
Design +
Implementation
Installation
Operation +
Maintenance
Modification
 development of a safety related function using 
Complex Programming Logic Devices (CPLD). It is 
stated by the authors that the development follows 
safety related standards such as the IEC 61508 [12] 
and the ISO 13849 [13]. The papers describe the 
development, several testing procedures and 
implementation using the derived system to guard a 
power drive system. Alvarez et al. [2] used PLDs to 
implement a 2oo3D system, which consists of a 
2oo3 safety architecture with an additional 
diagnostic system. They claim that their approach 
meets the required safety performance but is more 
flexible and cheaper as a full micro-processor 
system. 
Rapid prototyping and a full development suite 
from simulation to hardware design are an 
increasing research topic. Reyneri [17] describes an 
interesting code design system for rapid prototyping 
using FPGA systems. The described system 
contains Mathworks tools for high-level description 
languages and a simulation environment. The user 
can simulate and optimise system and architectural 
parameters before it is downloaded onto a user-
defined FPGA. 
Krakora and Hanzalek [14] from the Technical 
University in Prague present in their publication a 
testing methodology for hybrid Hardware-in-the-
Loop tests, for discrete events, time automata 
continuous systems and differential equations 
utilising FPGA technology. Their implementation 
concentrates on a discrete event system linked with 
continuous systems implemented as filters using 
fixed-point arithmetic. They use Matlab/UPPAAL 
in combination with FPGA based testing tool. 
Alberto et al. [1] describes an innovating filtering 
structure to detect gas particles using a FPGA 
system for processing the data and signals. Different 
filter structures were tested to achieve a high 
working frequency. 
The research by Astarloa et al. from the University 
of the Basque County [3] includes the development 
of a PID controller IP core to transfer computational 
expensive parts into hardware on an FPGA. This 
system is self-reconfigurable and different 
subsystems with altered features can be loaded and 
started during run time. 
Elhadef et al. [5] from the University Ottawa 
proposed a self-diagnostic technique exploiting 
generalised comparison models to detect several 
faults. They used an artificial immune system in 
order to carry out the diagnosis. Another attempt 
uses a multi-layered neural network [6] considering 
permanent faults in a t-diagnosable system. 
Another interesting approach is presented by 
Machado et al. [15] where simulation and formal 
verifications are combined to develop a reliable and 
safe controller. Timed Automata formalism and 
UPPAAL real time model checker are used to 
validate the derived model. 
 
III DESIGN 
The proposed structure and system has been 
developed with Matlab / Simulink, where it can be 
tested and simulated, before it is transferred into 
VHDL code and downloaded onto an FPGA [4]. 
Another possibility would be to develop only the 
application [16] and embed the developed software 
in an operating system and use a 1oo2 safety 
processor system. The ideas here are to derive, 
simulate and test a system suitable for small 
applications and after the results are satisfying to 
implement as much functionality as possible into 
hardware rather in software, but without losing any 
reliability feature. 
a) Hardware 
Figure 4 shows a schematic of a normally used 
system, which is classified as a 1oo1 structure as 
described before.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Sensor System 
For standard applications or demonstration purposes 
such a system might be sufficient but it contains no 
reliability and safety enhancements at all. If this 
system gets stuck or the execution freezes then it is 
not possible to call a safety function and to close the 
process under control or if this architecture is used 
in a sensor system, then the system cannot inform 
the higher processing unit e.g. a PLC (Programming 
Logic Controller) about the problem and to close its 
functionality in a systematic manner.  
 
Fig. 5: Sensor System with an error 
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 Figure 5 illustrates the problem, that when a part
fails the information cannot be delivered to the next 
processing hierarchy.  
The only safety function would be a watchdog 
which reacts with a reset of the entire system, when 
the watch dog time is elapsed. A system reset during 
a production can cause unpredictable situations and 
can harm people nearby and can cause hazardous 
situations. A safety function could be that the 
system creates an alarm or an event and send a 
message to a superior system or monitoring system 
and informs it that the particular system has to be 
shut down, necessary valves for examples are closed 
and relevant data is stored to analyse it afterwards 
or whatever functionality is considered for the 
safety function. 
b) Reliable Hardware 
In order to increase functional safety and 
availability of a system a multi-processor 
architecture in an N out of M structure is often 
recommended. A 1oo1 architecture as shown in 
Figure 4 is the simplest and often used system, but 
contains no safety architecture at all. If one of the 
subsystems (Input Processing Unit, Output) fails 
then the entire system might fail and a safety 
function might not be initiated to bring the system 
into a safe state. 
A 1oo2 system, as shown in Figure 7,  possesses 
two independent paths to call the safety function, if 
one of the two systems fail then the other one is still 
able to call the safety function. A schematic is 
shown below. 
 
Fig. 6: 1oo2 Safety System 
A 1oo2D system is similar compared to a 1oo2 
system, but it possesses a high degree of diagnostic 
procedures. The system is self-tested after each 
cycle and if a difference is diagnosed then the 
system is brought into a safe state. High diagnostic 
procedures are necessary to verify that each 
processor is functioning correctly.  
A system with a higher availability such as a 2oo2 
has a redundant structure but a lower reliability as 
both subsystems have to call the safe function. A 
schematic is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Fig. 7: 1oo2D Safety System 
A 2oo2 system is actually not a safety system as 
both systems have to call the safety function to 
bring the system into the safe state. However, a 
combination of a system with a higher degree of 
safety and availability lead to systems which can 
tolerate faults and can continue without shutting 
down the system. Many processes cannot be 
stopped but have to be continued until the process is 
completed, but such systems are not considered in 
this paper. 
 
Fig. 8: 2oo2 Safety System 
When developing reliable sensor systems, controller 
systems or filters, then using full multi-core 
architectures might become oversized in terms of its 
functionality not architecture, to execute few 
relatively simple mathematical operations, which 
are always carried out in the same way. However, 
sensor, controller or filter systems are becoming 
more reliable and are equipped with more intelligent 
methods and procedures. Sensors are not simple 
devices anymore to measure a physical value, but 
becoming complex computer systems by their own, 
e.g. equipped with Ethernet communication, 
wireless communication, analysis methods, filters; 
the development of such peripheral systems should 
follow the same development procedures and 
guidelines as safety and reliable systems. 
c) Reliable Design 
The structure considered in this paper is shown in 
Figure 9. A 1oo2 architecture should be used, which 
uses two different inputs, two processing units and 
two independent outputs. Both processing units 
possess diagnostic methods and the results are 
compared with each other. Diagnostic procedures 
are able to call the safety function and to bring the 
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 system into a safe state. Also, the processing unit 
itself has diagnostic procedures (in the application 
itself), which can detect that the information itself is 
not correct and either correcting procedures are 
called or if this is not sufficient enough, the safety 
function will be called as well.  
 
Fig. 9: 1oo2D Sensor System 
The safety function could be the transmission of an 
error code to the superior unit, e.g. a PLC which 
processes further the received value. This structure 
does not use a majority or minority voting, which 
can be found in some applications.  
d) Software application structure 
The figure below shows the normal application 
structure of a sensor system. Some diagnostic 
procedures are also implemented in this layer. But 
these diagnostics are concerned of the integrity of 
the processing value and not with the underlying 
diagnostics to determine the integrity of hardware 
and the overall system.  
 
Fig. 10: Sensor Application Structure 
The received data is firstly filtered due to noise, 
afterwards the data is verified that the value is 
within the allowed ranges otherwise the safety 
function is called. Afterwards, the data is processed 
and analysed which is the normal operation of the 
system and finally the data is sent to a superior unit, 
for example a PLC to be further processed. 
The plausibility check is one test of others to ensure 
that the received process value is correct, as shown 
below. Other tests would be to determine the 
gradient and to detect a steep increase which can be 
an indication of an error. 
 
Fig. 11: Test procedures at application layer 
The plausibility check mimics test procedures of 
industrial systems. The standard input value should 
be within the range of e.g. ± 10volts. The inputs are 
developed in such a way that they are able to 
measure inputs above the standard range (which is 
also a protection for the inputs), but provide a 
warning if the process value is above or below the 
±10volts. If the value approaches the ±15 then an 
error message is provided. In the same way this 
plausibility check works. 
The next diagnostic procedure is not situated in the 
application layer, where the value is tested but 
functionality of software should be tested, that it is 
still functioning tin a correct way, especially when 
microcontrollers (without an operating system) or 
FPGA systems are considered. The test procedure is 
explained using a filter as shown below, but it is 
valid for the plausibility checks and for the data 
processing algorithm as well, because every method 
has to be tested and diagnosed as well. 
 
Fig. 12: IIR - Filter 
The filter consists of memory blocks, summation 
and multiplication and this has to be tested, that the 
filter itself still has this functionality. Figure 13 
illustrates the filter under normal conditions. 
 
Fig. 13: normal operating mode 
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 During the test phase the IIR-Filter is tested. Firstly, 
all values stored in the memory have to be stored in 
a separate memory block. Every value has to be 
read twice, to ensure that the reading was done 
correctly. Afterwards, the filter is prepared with 
predefined values and a defined sequence is written 
to the inputs and the filtering procedure is carried 
out. Afterwards the results are compared with 
expected values. If a difference is identified then the 
filter is not working correctly and system has to be 
brought into the safe state. Figure 14 illustrates the 
procedure. 
 
Fig. 14: Testing mode 
If the test was successful, then the filter has to be 
loaded with the original values. It has to be ensured 
that the filter values are correct, therefore, the 
values are read back again and compared. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 15. 
 
Fig. 15: Restoring mode 
During normal operation, the test procedure has to 
be validated, then also this one can be damaged or 
alternated. This test has to be carried out in regular 
intervals to ensure that system is functioning 
correctly.  
 
Fig. 16: System test 
All the other functions have to be tested and 
validated in a similar way to ensure that overall 
function is in good condition. The diagnostics has to 
be done in both processors and the results have to be 
compared. Additionally to the processor, the 
peripheral components input and outputs have to be 
validated as well as demonstrated in Figure 16. 
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
Reliable system design and diagnostic is an 
important issue not only for large systems as 
programming logic controllers but also for sensors 
and actuators. It is not only necessary to maintain 
and indentify the health state of a plant, motor or 
compressor but also to indentify the health state of 
the sensors and actuators itself. This paper presented 
a strategy to develop a sensor system in a more 
reliable structure. This starts with the selection of an 
appropriate architecture via various test and 
diagnostic procedures.  
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